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 Revisiting Politicide: State Annihilation in Israel/Palestine 
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ABSTRACT 
State annihilation is a persistent concern in Israel/Palestine. While the specter 
of Israel’s destruction increasingly haunts Israeli public political debates, the 
actual materialization of Palestinian statehood seems to be permanently 
suspended, caught in an ever-protracted process of state-building. The current 
paper claims that to understand the unfolding of the discursive formations, as 
well as the spatial dimensions of conflict and control in Israel/Palestine, we 
should explicate the workings of the processes of politicide. Politicide, in this 
regard, denotes the eradication of the political existence of a group and 
sabotaging the turning of a community of people into a polity. This analysis 
suggests that the insistence that the State of Israel is under threat of extinction 
should be understood as a speech act, a performative reiteration, which allows 
for the securitization of Israeli rule in the occupied Palestinian territory, a 
securitization which then serves to rationalize the ongoing concrete politicide 
of the Palestinians. Elaborating on the concept of politicide, and diverging from 
defining it solely through the use of brute violence, this examination suggests 
that what is often overlooked in discussions of politicide are the seemingly more 
benign means of its implementation, the micro-power mechanisms of spatial 
control, prohibitions and regulations.  
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The political battle for statehood between Israel and the Palestinians has been 
haunted for decades by the prospect, real or imagined, of state annihilation. 
Despite the prevalence of alternative visions prior to the 1948 war (Azoulay, 
2014), the establishment of the State of Israel has construed these conditions of 
enmity as a zero-sum game, hinged on the logic of non-recognition. Both sides 
have repudiated the principle statehood rights of their counterpart, as well as 
their conflicting territorial demands (Gelvin, 2014). These premises underwent 
fundamental transformations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This first 
changed in 1988 when the Palestine Liberation Organization declared itself 
reconciled with the existence of the State of Israel (PLO, 2016), but it was not 
until the Oslo Accords of 1993 that this declaration was formally acknowledged 
by the Israeli leadership and was reciprocally answered with an Israeli 
recognition of the Palestinians’ rights for statehood. Thus, for all intents and 
purposes, the Oslo Accords were a game-changer in this regard and should have 
rendered the question of the annihilation of either state obsolete. Yet, delving 
below the surface of formal declarations, a more complex picture emerges. As 
the historical existential threat to the existence of the State of Israel seems to 
plague Israeli politics, and the actual establishment of the Palestinian state is 
perpetually deferred, the potential or actual spectacle of annihilation of either 
political entity dominates regional politics.  
Talk of state annihilation conjures up images of grand military forces sweeping 
over foreign territory, and of death and destruction of great magnitude. 
However, in this paper I want to suggest that the deliberate and systematic 
eradication of aspirations for statehood is not necessarily materialized through 
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the use of extensive acts of brute force, it can, at times, be manifested through 
less spectacular means. To provide an account of these processes, which are 
often more subtle and intricate, this paper focuses on the concept of politicide. 
Following the definition of this concept provided by Uradyn Bulag (2010), who 
elaborates on its use by Baruch Kimmerling (2003), politicide refers to “the 
destruction of the capacity to produce or reproduce a polity with the eventual 
aim of eliminating the ‘political identity’ of an ethnic group” (p. 431). Bulag thus 
distances the meaning of politicide from its articulation by scholars of genocide 
studies such as Barbara Harff (2005), who sees politicide as a sub-set of 
genocide. For Bulag, politicide does not refer to mass killings, but to a wide 
spectrum of processes, ranging from the social and cultural to the military, 
which are intended to deny communities of people the possibility of realizing 
their aspirations for self-determination, thus destroying their political and 
national existence.  
Despite its broad potential applicability, the concept of politicide has not 
received much scholarly attention thus far. This paper therefore aims to revisit 
this concept, and sets out on a double endeavor. First, it claims that the 
conceptual framework of politicide provides us with a fresh look at the 
processes which dominate regional politics in Israel/Palestine. The main thrust 
of this paper is dedicated to analyzing this assertion. Through this examination, 
this paper also aims to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of politicide 
for political analysis. Elaborating on the concept of politicide beyond its 
articulation by Bulag and Kimmerling, I will claim that this concept particularly 
calls for a space-centred analysis. The centrality of a spatial analysis becomes 
apparent when considering the triad constellation of state-sovereignty-
territory, which the international state-system dictates. Attempts at politicide 
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may be seen as being driven by the idea of territorial exclusivity which 
statehood entails, as the modern state is intrinsically tied to an imagined 
sovereign space, coherent, well-defined and exclusively controlled (Agnew, 
1994; 2009). Consequently, the congruence of sovereignty and territory, and 
the unfeasibility of overlapping sovereignties, may be found to act as driving 
factors for policies of politicide when competing territorial claims are at stake. 
Most evidently, therefore, in these analyses space is pivotal in the search for the 
motivations for politicide. However, spatial analysis should not merely be seen 
as providing explanatory factors. As national aspirations for statehood 
materialize through spatial manifestations, so do policies aimed to eliminate 
these aspirations depend on the ability to control and manipulate space. 
Effective policies of politicide should therefore be seen as gaining their efficacy 
through spatial means. Thus, the analysis provided here demonstrates the 
pivotal role of space-center examination for understanding the unfolding of 
politicidal practices and policies.  
Critical analysis of the Israeli regime and its forms of domination over the 
Palestinians has often retorted to labelling this regime as settler colonialism, as 
an ethnocracy, and even predicated on the principles of apartheid (cf. Gregory, 
2004; Yiftachel, 2006; Ram, 2007; Ghanim, 2008; Rashed & Short, 2012; 
Salamanca et al, 2012; Veracini, 2013; Yiftachel, 2015). Examining the policies 
of the Israeli regime through the concept of politicide is not an attempt to 
expand this exercise of name-calling, or to question the applicability of any of 
these terms. Yet, as surely all of these scholars would be quick to agree, none of 
these terms provides a comprehensive picture. The conceptual framework of 
settler colonialism, for instance, is adequate for explaining the history of 
Zionism, and current Israeli policies in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and in 
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Israel proper, but falls short in attempting to explicate Israel’s policies in the 
Gaza Strip. Similarly, the concept of ethnocracy is useful in deciphering Israeli 
forms of governing its citizen population, Jews and Palestinians alike, but is 
perhaps less equipped to explain the particular configurations of rule exercised 
by Israel on its population of Palestinian non-citizens. The term apartheid is 
often used polemically, or is narrated in a cautionary tale when political 
processes in Israel are described as leading to creeping apartheid. Thus, the 
focus on politicide allows the provision of a comprehensive rationale for what 
sometimes seems like contradictory and incoherent policies and decisions, as 
well as the highlighting of some of the interconnectivities between diverse 
processes. Moreover, as politicide is not only manifested materially (primarily 
through spatial control), but also shapes discursive configurations, it allows one 
to expose the manner in which space and discourse are interwoven in intricate 
ways.  
By providing a spatial analysis, and by focusing on the material conditions for 
state-formation, the examination of the configurations of Israeli rule over the 
Palestinians reaches beyond a discussion restricted to a focus on declarations 
of leaders, diplomatic maneuvering and on the politics of the peace talks. Yet, 
discussion of the threat of the politicide of Israel is often brushed aside in 
research, as no more than a rhetorical ploy, a transparent attempt to 
manipulate local and international public opinion. In the analysis that follows, 
I will suggest that even as such, the constant referral to the pending politicide 
of Israel is a performative speech act which does not only have a significant role 
to play in the discursive formations of the conflict, but, more importantly, is 
instrumental in the actual policies of Palestinian politicide executed by Israel. 
The focus on politicide, therefore, permits tying together these diverse 
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processes and exposing their interconnectivity. For this purpose, the following 
two sections focus on politicide as a central theme around which Israeli political 
discourses are organized. The third section of this paper provides a spatial 
analysis of the actual politicidal policies which Israel implements in the 
occupied Palestinian territory. By bringing these two facets together, we can, 
consequently, see how the reconfiguration of space and of the ability to make 
use of that space, has turned into a weapon in the war Israel is waging against 
the Palestinian political struggle for independence. It also shows how this war 
is configured to be intrinsically tied to the discursive formations of Israeli public 
discourses which are being rearranged around the theme of the supposedly 
looming destruction of the State of Israel. Thus, the interweaving of the two 
processes through the concept of politicide does not only highlight how this 
thematic connection provides a ready avenue of self-justification for Israeli 
actions, but also exposes their interdependent dynamics.  
 
    
 THE HIGH POLITICS OF POLITICIDE IN ISRAEL  
Historical aims to rid it notwithstanding, the existence of the State of Israel has 
long been a well-established fact. In its first decades it was the coalition of the 
Arab nations intent on doing away with the newly-formed state which posed the 
most immediate threat to its existence. However, this coalition has long 
disintegrated and no longer poses a real threat to Israel’s existence (Harkabi & 
Friedman, 1989). Moreover, in addition to being the only state to have nuclear 
weapons in the Middle East, Israel maintains a US-funded military which is one 
of the strongest and most advanced internationally.1 Thus, militarily there are 
no external enemies that can actually bring about its end. Moreover, despite 
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Israelis’ views to the contrary, the Israeli state enjoys unwavering international 
diplomatic backing by world hegemonic powers (Reinharz & Rabinovich, 
2007). And yet, the political discourse in Israel is increasingly dominated by the 
scare of extinction. As most Israelis, in addition to living through what is often 
perceived as an unresolvable violent conflict, have had to endure a sharp 
increase in social disparities, internal rifts and dramatically decreasing 
economic possibilities for the (shrinking) middle and (growing) lower classes 
since the early 2000’s (Sheferman, 2009), the deferral of the looming 
destruction of the Israeli state seems to be the best that Israeli politicians have 
to offer their voters. Indeed, Benyamin Netanyahu and his Likud party’s 2015 
election campaign, which resulted in a landslide victory, was mostly based on 
scare-tactics concerning Israel’s obliteration (Klein, 2015; NYT Editorial Board, 
2015; Prusher, 2015; Tarnopolsky, 2015; Tharoor, 2015). Evoking the threat of 
extinction is not unique to Israel; it is a well-worn manipulation to counter any 
internal political challenges and oppositions, which has been extensively used 
by political leaders in many historical and geopolitical contexts. However, in 
Israel, this tactic increasingly dominates the political discourse, not only during 
a time of elections.  
Beyond the usefulness of this scare tactic for the Israeli conservative leadership, 
there are other, underlying, aspects to the persistence of this issue. Israeli 
political leaders repeatedly refer to any act of resistance by the Palestinians, no 
matter how minute, as posing an existential threat to Israel. Even non-violent 
resistance is immediately labelled as an act of terror: the call for Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) on Israel has been dubbed ‘economic terror’ 
(cf. Benari, 2013); attempts to convince the UN to recognize the establishment 
of a Palestinian State has been called ‘diplomatic terror’ (cf. Keinon, 2012); and 
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appeals to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, and even to the 
Israeli High Court of Justice, to consider Israel’s violations of international law 
have been labelled ‘legal terror’ (cf. Zarchin, 2009). All of these forms of ‘terror’ 
are then identified as presenting an existential threat to the Israeli state, as they 
are framed as campaigns of ‘delegitimization’. The labelling of such campaigns 
as delegitimization efforts aims, in fact, to delegitimize these very campaigns, 
as it disassociates them from struggles for freedom, for human rights or for 
historical justice, and associates them with attempts to eliminate the Israeli 
state: “Delegitimization negates the right of the Jewish people to live in a 
sovereign democratic and Jewish state in the historic homeland of the Jewish 
people (modern day Israel)” (JFNA, 2015). Thus, according to this framing, 
Palestinian resistance, be it violent or non-violent, is never a response to the 
ongoing Israeli occupation and oppression; rather, it is always already aimed at 
bringing an end to the State of Israel.2 It is obvious that neither teenagers armed 
with pocketknives, nor cultural and academic boycotts, nor even unguided 
missiles launched from Gaza or the occasional suicide bomber can bring about 
Israel’s doom. However, the persistency of this issue discloses something else, 
precisely due to its evident refutability, and not merely the extent of hyperbolic 
talk which characterizes Israeli politics.  
Presenting Israel as having to deal with a constant threat of extinction serves 
Israel’s conservative elites in sustaining the status-quo. Most significantly, it is 
instrumental to Israeli political leadership in counteracting demands, both 
internally and externally, for holding it accountable for the lack of a political 
resolution to the conflict, and allows it to deflect criticism concerning its 
responsibility for the stalemate in the everlasting peace negotiations. Moreover, 
portraying every act of aggression or even resistance by the Palestinians as 
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posing an existential threat to the State of Israel is key for maintaining the 
illusion of a bilateral conflict. Thus, claiming that the threat to Israeli existence 
is integral to the current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as Israeli 
political leaders often do, is essential to the insistence on representing Israeli 
and Palestinians as two sides in a (somewhat imbalanced, yet) symmetric 
conflict. This insistence feeds the victimization discourse in Israel and aids in 
masking the reality of the actual power relations, of Israel’s status as a regional 
military superpower and its overwhelming domination over the Palestinians.  
Beyond retaining the illusion of a symmetric conflict, insistence on the looming 
politicide of Israel serves additional political goals. Claiming that the 
Palestinians are, in fact, harboring the wish to do away with the State of Israel 
suggests that the solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict cannot be reached 
by ending the Israeli occupation. Thus, rather than seeing the political solution 
to the conflict as redressing the situation created in 1967, as agreed upon in the 
Oslo Accords, this perspective claims that the Palestinians see the conflict in the 
context of 1948. Israeli advocates of this stance therefore claim that since the 
Palestinians are secretly holding on to the desire to roll back the clock to a 
period before the Israeli state was established, there can never be a real and 
sincere political resolution to the conflict that falls short of dismantling the 
State of Israel. However, the Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling (2003) 
suggests that in actuality, the insistence of Israeli politicians that the politicide 
of Israel looms close serves an even more sinister objective. Kimmerling claims 
that folded into this perspective is a semi-acknowledged desire on the part of 
Israelis, which is increasingly gaining legitimacy in Israeli mainstream political 
discourse, also to go back to 1948. The return to 1948 in this discourse is not 
aimed at the undoing of the Israeli state; quite the contrary, it wishes to reenact 
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the historic moment of state formation and to harness its ‘constituent violence’ 
(Benjamin, 1986) once again. However, the wish is to use this violence, this time 
round, to fully accomplish what was done only partially then. Thus, according 
to Kimmerling, this talk of the pending Israeli politicide is used, in actuality, by 
Israeli politicians to gradually legitimize a plan to ethnically cleanse the entire 
area of the Land of Israel (historical Palestine) of Palestinians (Kimmerling, 
2003, 150).  
 
  
POLITICIDE IN ISRAELI PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
It is very clear how the constant re-evoking of Israeli politicide serves the 
interests of the conservative Israeli political elites in their promotion of 
particular political agendas, yet, it is less obvious why it gains such resonance 
among the Jewish-Israeli public. To be sure, for Jewish-Israelis the threat of 
extinction, political and/or otherwise, must be understood in the context of the 
historic trauma of the holocaust. More accurately: the role of this historic 
memory in the shaping of Jewish national identity cannot be overstated. It is 
not only that this memory haunts Jewish national identity, but it is also very 
much connected, historically and thematically, to the establishment of the State 
of Israel. While Jewish national aspirations for statehood preceded the 
holocaust by more than half a century, the actual establishment of the State of 
Israel, and the international support its establishment gained, is directly 
connected to this act of genocide. Moreover, Israel is often depicted as the 
remedy for any and all attempts to target Jews once again. By making this 
connection explicit, the liquidation of the State of Israel is closely tied to the 
scare of extermination for Jewish-Israelis. The fact that, as Israelis scholars are 
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quick to remind us, the memory of the holocaust is often abused by political 
leaders for their own political gains (cf. Zuckermann, 1988; 2001; Zertal, 2005) 
should not be seen as diminishing the role of the holocaust in the Jewish-Israeli 
imagination; quite the contrary. While feeding the collective anxiety, these 
blunt manipulations sustain their efficacy particularly due to the vividness of 
this historic extermination, as the memory of the holocaust is woven into the 
national identity of Jewish-Israelis through the education system, as well as by 
other apparatuses of state indoctrination (Ben-Amos & Bet-El, 1999; Dror, 
2001; Resnik, 2003). Thus, in the Israeli public discourse, the memory of the 
holocaust fuels talk of Israeli politicide with a readily accessible threat of 
extermination (Klar et al, 2013).  
Obviously, the Jewish-Israeli public is not simply the passive recipient of the 
manipulative use of the historic memory of the holocaust by its political leaders 
and, once again, the conflating of Israeli politicide with this historic atrocity 
serves to justify current-day aggression towards the Palestinians. To an extent, 
in a post-traumatic vain, any and all acts of (Palestinian) resistance to Israel 
automatically evoke notions of (Nazi) extermination, as if it were happening in 
the here and now. Thus, any measure to stifle resistance is necessarily seen as 
a justifiable act of defense, no matter how disproportionate or unwarranted. 
Yet, more importantly, seeing themselves as the ultimate historic victims of 
persecution grants Jewish-Israelis moral exoneration from their own present-
day wrong-doings.  
Talk of Israeli politicide (amplified through its re-contextualization as a new 
holocaust) does not merely serve Jewish-Israelis’ self-justification for the acts 
of aggression towards the Palestinians committed by their elected 
governments; to best understand its additional roles, we should examine how 
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future-oriented political thinking has been reshaped in this discourse since the 
early 2000s. While reiteration of the commitment by consecutive Israeli 
governments to the two-state solution indeed helps to deflect criticism of Israel 
in the international political arena, the notion of a two-state resolution to the 
conflict has carried very little weight in internal Israeli politics since the 
outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2001. Since then, repeated surveys have 
shown that while many Jewish-Israelis still declare that they wish Israel would 
reach a political agreement with the Palestinians, and would be willing to accept 
the two-state solution as the end-point of that process, an overwhelming 
majority of them do not believe that reaching this agreement is at all viable 
(Gaon, 2014). Consequently, all talk of allowing the Palestinians to establish an 
independent state is associated with the ever shrinking left-leaning Israeli 
peace camp and is defined as politicide (as a form of personal political suicide) 
for any mainstream politician aspiring to be elected. Presumably, the fact that 
this positive political future is fast fading, and no other is in sight, could have 
dragged Israel into the rabbit hole of political nihilism. Absurd as it may seem, 
I would like to claim that, in this sense, the allusion to Israeli politicide serves 
to save the Israeli political debate from itself. In this political environment, the 
persistent talk of the (supposed) looming end to Israel, should be seen as the 
negative pole in future-oriented thinking, in the absence of an alternative 
positive horizon. Thus, in lieu of constructive forward-thinking programs, the 
Israeli political debate clings to competing plans for preventing Israel’s doom. 
In other words, for a society which is consumed by conflict, in which no positive 
image of a conflict-free future may be envisioned (short of all-out-war), 
prospects are articulated through a negative image of what should be avoided 
at all costs.  
Merav Amir   
13 | P a g e  
 
Ostensibly, to avoid this extremely pessimistic strand of politics, all that Israelis 
have to do is to regain their faith in reaching a historic peace agreement with 
the Palestinians, an agreement that is assumed to follow the two-state solution 
in one form or another. Why is it that much of the Israeli public seems to 
repudiate what to an outsider may seem as the only sane and accessible 
resolution of this bloody conflict? While some analysts tend to assume that, 
exhausted by decades of war and terror, Israeli public opinion has been 
corrupted by blunt manipulations of conservative hardliners (cf. Gaon, 2014), 
there may be another way of looking at this. To understand this, we should take 
a closer look at the political reality in Israel/Palestine. Many leading analysts 
and researchers of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have already reached the 
conclusion that dividing the territory of historic Palestine into two states is no 
longer a realistic option, and this solution cannot be realized, even with the best 
of intentions (cf. Benvenisti, 1984; Jamal, 2001; Beinin et al, 2006; Farouk-Alli, 
2007; El-Hasan, 2010; Faris, 2013; O'Malley, 2015). The fact that as of 2016, 
almost 10% of the Jewish-Israeli population is living in occupied territory, the 
disproportionate political representation of the settlers in Israeli corridors of 
power, the ever-growing co-dependency of the Palestinian and Israeli 
economies and, in particular, the dependence of Israel on natural resources 
extracted from the occupied area (including water aquifers, quarries and land 
reserves), the internal and seemingly irreparable rifts in Palestinian politics and 
the rise of Islamic Palestinian fundamentalism, have all been sighted in this 
literature as each being a sufficient cause for precluding the coming into being 
of a Palestinian state. Consequently, since Israel is the de-facto sovereign of the 
entire area, rather than seeing the realization of the two-state solution as 
temporarily pending, a more accurate depiction would be to describe Israel as 
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a binational state stretching across the entire region of historic Palestine, in 
which the Palestinian residents are deprived of their full civic rights and 
protections (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2010; Benvenisti, 2010; Azoulay & Ophir, 
2012; Yiftachel, 2015). As stated by Miron Benvenisti (2010): “in the absence of 
any political process, a de-facto binational structure, was willy-nilly, 
entrenched” (ibid). And it seems as though on some fundamental level, the 
Israeli public is already very much aware of this fact. 
As the realization that the two-state solution is no longer a pragmatic option is 
gradually taking hold, the prospect of the one state is not perceived as plausible 
by most Jewish-Israelis, since the forming of a single state in the entire area of 
historic Palestine may only amount to one of two alternatives. Provided that full 
civic rights are granted to all residents of this area, Jewish-Israelis would 
quickly find themselves as a minority in a predominantly Palestinian state.3 Any 
attempt to avoid this inevitable outcome that would fall short of providing the 
Palestinians with full civic rights, would spell out the formulization and the 
codification of the (existing) de-facto apartheid, and would not be accepted 
internationally. Therefore, Jewish legal, social and cultural privilege is what is 
perceived as being at risk if this binational structure materializes in formal 
politics, since once the Jewish majority is jeopardized, this state, called Israel 
or by any other name, would no longer be defined as Jewish. Thus, in this 
regard, when the demolition of the State of Israel is imagined, what is actually 
lamented is the presumed revoking of this privilege. Yet, we should remember 
that, as aforementioned, in the national Jewish imagery, the identity of the 
State of Israel as a Jewish state cannot be understood as disassociated from the 
role Israel plays in the prevention of the next holocaust. In this context, Jewish 
supremacy in Israel is perceived by Jewish Israelis as intrinsically linked to the 
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very real survival of the Jewish people. Consequently, as more and more Israelis 
are disillusioned by the two-state political solution, the only alternative future 
that is readily accessible to them is not simply undesirable, but is actually seen 
as that which should be avoided at all costs, as it imagined as bringing about 
their doom. 
Moreover, to understand what else is at stake it is important to remember that 
the state, any state for that matter, is an abstract construct which is malleable 
and open for appropriation, manipulation and conflicting interpretations by the 
ruling powers. Adi OPHIR (2010) claims that the state should be understood as 
a non-tenable entity which is mainly used for fostering, often violently, the 
manufacturing of cohesion, unity, homogeneity and boundedness. 
Additionally, the state is the means through which a ruling power performs 
closure: “In more general terms it may be shown that in every field and sphere 
displaying power relations, domination, control, and intervention, the juridico-
political apparatus of sovereignty is entrusted with the closure of these relations 
within the state as a particularizing whole” (p. 79). For nation-states, this 
closure is attained first and foremost through the nation, as the historic origins 
of the state (p. 93). Imagining that the state is in peril, therefore, does not only 
allow for intensified processes of ‘border-control’, but to reasserting the natural 
and seemingly obvious connection between the nation and the state. When in 
actuality, separation is no longer possible and can hardly be justified, and when 
Jews and Palestinians de-facto live in a binational state under a single 
sovereignty (albeit with very highly differential relations to this ruling power), 
the insistence that Israel is on the verge of being annihilated appears to be one 
of the few remaining venues for portraying Israel as congruent with the Jewish-
Israeli nation. Since in this binational existence, the purely Jewish nation-state 
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which is portrayed as being in peril, is long gone (if it ever existed), buying into 
the scare of politicide is the only means through which Jewish-Israelis can 
imagine the uninterrupted unity of (Israeli) state and (Jewish) nation not only 
as an object of desire, but as if it were their reality at present.  
 
 
THE POLITICIDE OF PALESTINE 
The Oslo Accords did not only change the discursive premise of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict into the formal endorsing of the two-state solution by the 
two parties to the conflict, it also facilitated tangible processes of Palestinian 
state-building. Following the Accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was 
established and, with the close guidance, funding and supervision of the 
international community, the formal and institutional requisites of state-
making processes took place (Frisch, 1998; Milton‐Edwards, 1998; Jamal, 
2001; Hovsepian, 2008). Thus, the Palestinian strive for independence has long 
passed the stage of a mere armed struggle and has taken shape through the 
actual formation of a proto-state in the occupied Palestinian territory. 
Moreover, while until 2011, the full establishment of the Palestinian state was 
pending the conclusions of the peace negotiations, the PA has since changed its 
tactics and has been actively seeking an alternative, unilateral, route for making 
Palestine a reality (Schell, 2011). Hence, Palestinian statehood should be 
understood as suspended despite all efforts of the PA and other Palestinian 
political actors to the contrary, and the prevention of its coming into being 
should be examined as actively instigated. Thus, the enduring suspension of 
turning this pending state into a fully-independent state merits attention, since 
it enable the exposing of some of the implicit and tangible conditions for state 
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formation which are at work in this case, when the formal requirements for 
statehood are, in fact, already satisfied. In what follows, I wish to decipher some 
of the key factors through which this active politicide is carried out.  
Much of the discussion of what hinders the realization of Palestinian statehood 
focuses on external circumstances. In some of these debates the international 
alliances and the role of global political hegemonies are highlighted, while 
others focus on the question of how much the Palestinian proto-state is 
compliant with the requirements of international law (cf. Nanda et al, 1988; 
Boyle, 1990; Crawford, 1990; de Waart, 1994; McKinney, 1994–1995; Becker, 
1998; Silverberg, 1998; Quigley, 2002; Goldsmith, 2003; Ronen, 2010; Quigley, 
2012). By contrast, the examination provided below focuses on a spatial 
analysis, aiming to expose the material conditions which are at play that throttle 
Palestinian statehood and actively promote Palestinian politicide. Prior 
research has also identified the fragmentation of the Palestinian semi-
autonomic rule into discrete enclaves as hindering Palestinian state formation 
(Gregory, 2004; Handel, 2010). Yet, as is evident from other geopolitical 
contexts, territorial continuity in and of itself should not be seen as a necessary 
condition for statehood, as there are ample international examples in which 
states traverse territorial fragmentation, either stretching across physical 
barriers (such as bodies of water), or are discontinued by other sovereign 
territories. Thus, it is not that spatial disunity in and of itself may explain the 
Palestinian predicament; rather, other factors should be seen as of consequence 
here, deeming this particular type of territorial disunity detrimental to the 
realization of sovereign independence.  
Moreover, the relentless talk of the possible politicide of the State of Israel in 
Israeli public discourse should not be seen as independent of the actual 
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suppression of Palestinian political aspirations. My claim is that discussions of 
Israeli politicide and the actual suspension of the materialization of Palestinian 
political independence are not only thematically linked or need to be considered 
jointly for the purpose of reciprocity, but that there is a causal relationship here. 
In other words, the construction of Israeli politicide as a pending threat is 
instrumental in the execution of actual politicidal policies of the Palestinians by 
Israel. The linkage between the two is, not surprisingly, hinged on security. The 
portrayal of all Palestinian struggles aimed at realizing political aspirations as 
posing an existential threat to the State of Israel, as aforementioned, gives way 
to the securitization of Israeli political forms of domination, which work to stifle 
Palestinian independence. Prior research has already demonstrated the extent 
to which the language of security has been repeatedly used to justify any and all 
policies taken by Israel which suppress Palestinian freedom (cf. Hanafi, 2005; 
Usher, 2005; Coskum, 2008; Ghanim, 2008; Amir, 2011; Gordon, 2011; 
Whitaker, 2011; Azoulay & Ophir, 2012). From the perspective provided here, 
we can make this claim more precise. Israeli security policies should not merely 
be understood as presented, as safeguarding Israelis against Palestinian 
aggression; rather, they are explained as if they were counteracting attempts of 
Israeli politicide. They are, therefore, construed as intrinsically linked to the 
survival of the State of Israel and, due to the discursive implication of the 
memory of the holocaust into this construction, also to the survival of the 
Jewish nation as a whole. From this perspective, no measure, no policy, no 
extent of human strife these policies entail seem too outrageous or extreme, as 
they are all justified a-priori, since it is all rationalised as if what is at stake is 
nothing short of the national and physical survival of the Jews and of the Jewish 
nation. 
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Seen from this perspective, we can now examine the measures of control which 
Israel employs in the occupied territory. The blockade which Israel imposes 
over the Gaza Strip, for instance, renders this area subordinate to Israeli 
control, despite its presumed autonomy. Similarly, the policies which Israel 
implements in the West Bank through its checkpoint regime negate the ability 
of Palestinian self-governance. While both forms of control are explained as 
derivatives of security considerations, despite ample evidence to the contrary, 
in what follows I suggest that examined together it becomes evident that these 
policies are oriented towards obstructing Palestinian political aspirations. 
  
Blockading the Gaza Strip 
At first glance, it would seem as though claiming that Israel is implementing 
policies which sever Palestinian political independence in Gaza may be 
perceived as counterintuitive. The withdrawal of Israeli forces, the dismantling 
of the settlements and the severing of almost all social, personal and 
commercial connections between Gaza and Israel by increasingly limiting the 
movement of people and goods between Israel and the Strip, have been 
repeatedly highlighted by Israel as marking the end of Israeli control over the 
Strip and its residents. Indeed, the 2005 Disengagement Plan was perceived at 
the time by some as a positive step towards Palestinian independence (Efrat, 
2006; Golan, 2008; Rynhold & Waxman, 2008). However, in actuality, the 
Disengagement laid the foundations for rendering this presumed independence 
to be a failure. By not only imposing severe restrictions on the movement of 
people and merchandise between its territory and the Strip, but also with the 
rest of the world, Israel turned the closure into a fully-fledge blockade and laid 
the foundations for completely isolating this region. Halting all traffic through 
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Gaza’s seaport and implementing a full maritime siege, destroying Gaza’s only 
airport and maintaining absolute aerial control and imposing strict control over 
all its overland crossings (not only those on the boundary with Israel, but also, 
by proxy, over the Rafah crossing bordering Egypt, see: Bashi & Mann, 2007), 
this closure has turned the Gaza Strip into one of the most isolated areas on 
earth.4  
To date, almost a decade later, the closure of the Strip means that but for 
exceptional occasions, the entrance and exit of Gaza residents is rare and 
sporadic and is dependent on obtaining scantly-issued permits by Israel, the 
entrance of Israeli and West Bank residents is completely forbidden and the 
entrance of foreigners is mostly restricted to aid workers and members of 
official delegations (Gisha, 2016). The blockade of Gaza is detrimental for the 
more than 1.5 million residents of the Strip, who are trapped within one of the 
most densely occupied territories in the world. The strict restrictions that Israel 
has been imposing on the movement of people and goods in and out of the Gaza 
Strip stifle any attempts at the economic development of the Strip, to the extent 
that its soaring unemployment has exceeded international records (UNCTAD 
secretariat, 2015), and the majority of its residents are dependent on external 
aid to avoid starvation (World Bank, 2015). The implications of the blockade 
reach well beyond the economic ruination of the Strip. The blockade of the Gaza 
Strip does not only rob its residents of their livelihoods, it cuts off the residents 
of the Strip from their next of kin, their social relations and communities, many 
of which are in the West Bank, Israel and East Jerusalem (Bashi & Diamond, 
2015), and it also has arrested the educational, professional and personal 
development of Gazans for almost a decade to date. In particular, it renders the 
lives of Gaza’s youth desperate, as it deprives them for any hope for the future 
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(Roy, 2015). Moreover, for some, the ongoing blockade literally spells death, as 
the inability to leave the Strip deprives them of access to life-saving medical 
treatment which is not available in Gaza’s strained medical system (WHO, 
2014). The devastating effects of the blockade, both social and economic, have 
been adequately documented and analyzed by human rights organizations, by 
investigative journalists, as well as by prior research (cf. Li, 2006; Collins, 
2008; Sharp, 2008; Hass, 2009; Associated Press, 2010; Gisha, 2010b; 2010a; 
Handel, 2010; PHR-Israel, 2011; Roy, 2011; Gisha, 2012; McCloskey, 2012; 
Rubinstein, 2012; Beaumont & Balousha, 2014; WHO, 2014; Davidovich, 2015; 
Etkes & Zimring, 2015; Lewis, 2015; Oxfam, 2015; Winter, 2015).  
Since the 2005 Disengagement, the official Israeli stance is that it should no 
longer be considered an occupier of the Gaza Strip, and that the Strip is 
independently ruled by the Palestinians, a stance which has been ratified by the 
Israeli Supreme Court (MFA, 2008). Moreover, the declaration of the Gaza 
Strip as “hostile territory” (PM Office, 2007), in response to the Hamas takeover 
in 2007, stressing the enmity between the Israeli and the Gazan governments, 
was aimed at underscoring the status of Gaza as external and independent of 
Israel. The validity of these claims has been challenged by an array of legal 
experts claiming that as long as Israel maintains its spatial control over the 
perimeters of the Strip, it is still the de-facto occupier of the area (cf.Bruderlein, 
2004; Aronson, 2005; Bashi & Mann, 2007; B'Tselem, 2016; Gross, 
Forthcoming). The importance of the legal debates notwithstanding, there is 
still merit to examining the actual political implications of the blockade. Even 
if we assume that a quasi-independent Palestinian rule, which falls short of full 
sovereignty, may be exercised in Gaza, despite Israel maintaining its control 
over the Strip’s boundaries, it is important to note that the blockade Israel 
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enforces is structured to increase, rather than decrease, Gaza’s dependence on 
Israel, a dependency which undermines the robustness of this rule in tangible 
ways. In her analysis of the manner in which the closure policy was 
implemented between its inception in 1991 and the execution of the 
Disengagement Plan in 2005, Sara Roy (2007) has already claimed that it 
should be seen as contradictory in nature. Rather than understanding this 
policy as a means for increasing the levels of separation between Israel and the 
Gaza Strip, these means should be understood as operating to increase the 
dependency of the residents of Gaza on Israel, economically as well as 
administratively. For this aim, she shows how the forms of de-development that 
were implemented by Israeli rule over the Strip throughout this period ensured 
that this area would not be able to become self-sustaining or to be freed from 
its dependence on Israel. These forms of obstructing independent development 
were never reversed, rather, they have only become more substantial as the 
closure has tightened and turned into a full-fledged blockade. For instance, the 
implemented closure obstructed the ability of industry in Gaza to sustain itself, 
due to restrictions on the flow of raw materials into the Strip and on the 
transport of products from the Strip, ensuring the dependence of Gaza on 
imports from Israel. Similarly, the closure also enabled the forestallment, 
destruction or prevention of developing infrastructure projects. This entailed 
an increasing reliance of Strip residents on Israel for the prevision of water, 
electricity, gas and other essential needs for the sustainment of the mundane 
aspects of living.  
The closure in the earlier years, and the subsequent blockade, were both 
rationalized in the language of security. The presumed threat that the 
Palestinians pose to Israel’s existence explains the highly restrictive policies and 
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the forms of spatial control Israel exercises. However, this assertion is 
questionable at best. High-ranking officers in the Israeli army repeatedly claim 
that the blockade is doing more harm than good to Israel’s security (Lewis, 
2015), and prominent Israeli cabinet members have also admitted that the 
blockade falls short of reaching both its security and political aims (Bennett, 
2016). However, by ensuring almost complete dependence on the provisions 
allowed in by Israel for maintaining its bare sustenance, Israel implements a 
policy of control by proxy, as Israel leverages its ability to regulate the flow in 
and out of the Strip to pressure the Palestinians to concede to its political 
agendas. Similarly, Israel’s control over the Palestinian population registry 
dictates an administrative dependency. Thus, for instance, as Israel does not 
allow Palestinians to change their place of residence, people cannot 
permanently move from Gaza to the West Bank and vice versa. The registering 
of Palestinian births and deaths, the issuing of passports and travel permits are 
all dependent on the good will and the conditioned willingness of Israel to 
comply. 
Very generally we can see that the presumed independence granted to the 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip was predisposed to be doomed from the onset. As 
the establishment of independent rule is challenging in the most favorable of 
conditions, it stood little chance when construed on a defunct economy, 
constantly on the brink of humanitarian disaster, and in relation to a socially 
deflated population. The Palestinian population in Gaza is not only 
internationally isolated, but also cut off from its familial, communal and 
national ties. These ties stretch into Israel proper and the neighboring 
countries, but are most significant in the West Bank population. The violent 
military attacks which Israel performs periodically in the Strip, reaching ever-
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increasing levels of death and ruination with every round, only exacerbate the 
stress and trauma of an already devastated society. The severe limitations on 
the flow of essential building materials forestall the reconstruction of the Strip. 
As large areas lay in ruin, many residents find themselves displaced within the 
Strip itself for years on end. Moreover, we should keep in mind that this 
presumed independence is a far cry from Palestinian national aspirations, as it 
is granted on the condition of the disassociation of the Strip from the West 
Bank. Deprived of having even the most basic control over its boundaries and 
airspace, provisioned on conditions which are set to undermine its viability to 
begin with, this alleged independence, is established along the contours of a 
failed state. An analysis of the Hamas regime and the political circumstances in 
Gaza, and the question as to whether this failure has actually been realized, is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion; the examination herein confines 
itself to looking at what Israeli policies have actually been geared to produce. In 
this regard, we can see that the conditions in Gaza have been designed to 
engender a premeditated failure. This failure, I claim, has broader political 
implications. We can see that Israel’s insistence that Gaza is indeed 
independent is aimed to demarcate this failure as a precursor of a larger, 
pending, failure, that of a more general Palestinian independence. Thus, the 
inability of the Palestinians to realize the impossible, and to create and sustain 
a viable and flourishing mini-state in the contours of the Gaza Strip, is often 
used by Israeli state representatives as a case study of a sort. Gaza as a failure 
is aimed to demonstrate the Palestinians’ principle un-readiness for full and 
independent statehood. In this regard, the blockade of Gaza should not only be 
understood as facilitating the inability to realize Palestinian political 
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independence in Gaza itself, but should also be understood as an instrumental 
factor in the construing of Palestinian politicide more generally.  
 
The Defragmentation of the West Bank 
The reconfiguration of space and restrictions on movement are also at the core 
of Israeli control over the West Bank and, like in the Gaza Strip, these should 
be understood as instrumental in the engendering of Palestinian politicide. 
However, in the West Bank these facets of Israeli rule are manifested in 
configurations which differ significantly than those implemented in the Gaza 
Strip. In fact, it would be more precise to describe the ruling configurations 
implemented by Israel in Gaza as diametrically opposed to those applied in the 
West Bank. This opposition is neither incidental nor inconsequential and 
should be understood as also playing a central role in Palestinian politicide.5 In 
the West Bank, which, unlike Gaza, is still dotted with close to one hundred 
settlements and has strong military presence, Israel operates dozens of military 
checkpoints for monitoring and limiting Palestinian movement. Like the 
blockade on Gaza, these checkpoints are explained by Israel as merely there to 
serve security purposes, aimed at preventing the carrying out of attacks by 
Palestinians. “I tell the soldiers that they are protecting their homes and 
families; we drive home that message all the time” says lieutenant colonel Gil 
Mamon, a battalion commander of the Military Police, whose soldiers are 
manning West Bank checkpoints (quoted in Lappin, 2015). However, in 2008 
a group of retired Israeli generals, including Ilan Paz, who was the first to set 
up checkpoints in the West Bank during the Second Intifada, claimed that the 
checkpoints do more harm than good when it comes to ensuring the security of 
Israelis (Copans, 2008). Accordingly, research has demonstrated that the 
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actual contribution of the checkpoints to Israel’s security is questionable at best 
(Byman, 2011; Longo et al, 2014). Operating under the cloak of security, the 
actual political effects of the checkpoints are very tangible. The checkpoints 
fragment Palestinian space in the West Bank into small isolated enclaves, 
rendering all movement between these enclaves subject to the checking 
procedures and irregular activity of these checkpoints. The harsh effects of the 
checkpoints on all aspects of Palestinian life in the West Bank have been 
reviewed at length by prior research (Hass, 2002; Jamoul, 2004; Migdal, 2004; 
Erlanger, 2005; Hanafi, 2005; Zeedani, 2005; Hass, 2006; B'Tselem, 2007; 
Kotef & Amir, 2007; Weizman, 2007; Wigoder, 2007; Ghanim, 2008; Batniji et 
al, 2009; Handel, 2009; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2009; Tawil-Souri, 2009; Kotef 
& Amir, 2011; Azoulay & Ophir, 2012).  
As aforementioned, elsewhere I have already explicated extensively on how the 
West Bank checkpoints, and the limitations on Palestinian movement, serve to 
stifle the vitality of an independent Palestinian political entity (Amir, 2013).  To 
reiterate in short, this fragmentation of Palestinian space and hindrances on 
Palestinian movement does not only carry dire implications for the people 
living in this space and for the ability of the Palestinian economy to recover, but 
is also the principal impediment to the establishment of a viable Palestinian 
political entity in the West Bank. However, stating that the checkpoints hinder 
Palestinian political development is not the same as claiming that the 
checkpoints serve an overt Israeli policy of politicide, since obstructing the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian political entity may be the side 
effect of policies oriented elsewhere. To claim that the operation of the 
checkpoints does amount to a blunt policy of politicide would demand 
identifying patterns of activity which cannot be interpreted as serving any other 
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purpose. In this regard, I suggest that there is one factor, one element in the 
operation of the checkpoints that may only be attributed to a deliberate attempt 
at politicide, and that element is their excessiveness. The excessiveness of the 
checkpoints is not only manifested through their density (as of December of 
2015 there were 542 checkpoints, roadblocks and other movement obstacles in 
the West Bank, an area which is smaller than the state of Delaware) (MEMO, 
2016), but also in the way in which they operate, as I demonstrate shortly. 
A close examination of the ways in which Palestinian movement within the 
West Bank is managed provides a picture of a movement-regulatory system 
gone astray. Any and all movement of persons and goods between the different 
enclaves in the West Bank is subjected to restrictions and limitations posed by 
Israeli forces. Even if the checkpoints are explained as serving security 
purposes, the excessiveness that is part and parcel of the operation of the 
checkpoints cannot be rationalized to that end. Often, this excessiveness is seen 
as no more than a form of abuse and harassment that Israel imposes on the 
West Bank Palestinian population, yet my claim is that it should be understood 
as a key factor in the undermining of the political vitality of Palestinian rule and 
in ensuring that it remain deprived of any actual political power. The intensity 
of Israeli means of regulating Palestinian movement renders any type of 
Palestinian rule subordinate to Israeli control. Thus, the de-facto hold that 
Israeli authorities have over the Palestinian population negates any formal or 
de-jure demesne that any other governance would have over this same 
population. This is not to claim that there are no other governing apparatuses 
in place; both the PA and a large number of non-governmental organizations 
participate in the governance of different aspects of Palestinian life in the West 
Merav Amir   
28 | P a g e  
 
Bank (Hammami, 2000). However, they all function within the limitations set 
by Israel and are very much dependent on it.  
As aforementioned, the West Bank checkpoints and the besiegement of Gaza 
are both explained by Israel as necessary security means for battling Palestinian 
terror. However, looking at these measures it quickly becomes apparent that 
even for security means, they seem extreme. Confining the almost two million 
residents of Gaza to the narrow and highly dense stretch of lend of the Strip for 
over a decade to date, with no end in sight, or depriving the freedom of 
movement for all Palestinian West Bank residents, and imposing the daily 
abuse and humiliation that come with having to constantly go through 
checkpoints, do not seem like adequate responses to the presumed threat that 
Palestinian terror may pose for Israelis. All of this indeed may seem 
disproportionate; no matter how high the motivation for violent resistance 
among the occupied population is perceived to be, nobody seems to suggest that 
with the meager means at their disposal Palestinians can actually cause more 
than peripheral harm to Israelis. What allows for justifying the extremity of 
these measures is the portraying of Palestinian resistance as oriented towards 
attempting to liquidate the State of Israel, no matter how unfounded this claim 
may be. Presumably, when the threat of politicide is at stake, nothing seems to 
be too excessive or unjust. Yet, how can the Palestinians be portrayed as posing 
this kind of threat to Israel which prides itself on having one of the most highly 
trained and sophisticated armies in the world? To make this leap we should 
understand that it is not the actual means of resistance that Palestinians may 
deploy that is seen as posing the existential threat to the Israeli state, but, 
rather, the political aspirations that they encapsulate. Thus, despite all claims 
to the contrary, Israel still regards itself as entangled in the zero-sum game of 
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statehood with the Palestinians, and Palestinian independence is perceived as 
spelling the end of the Israeli state. This is why the forms of control which Israel 
deploys should be understood as aimed, first and foremost, at the politicide of 
Palestine. From this perspective it becomes apparent how the discursive 
pervasiveness of the threat to Israeli existence justifies and facilitates the actual 
execution of Palestinian politicide.  
   
   
 CONCLUSION   
The analysis of the configurations of Israeli control over the West Bank and 
Gaza in this paper has demonstrated that it is movement, rather than spatial 
cohesion, that appears to be the determining factor for establishing an 
independent rulership. More particularly, it is the ability to control and regulate 
movement that this analysis has exposed as appearing to be at the core of 
political independence. The ability to control the flow of persons and goods was 
already identified by Michel Foucault as underlying biopolitical rule and the 
sustainment of governmentality (Foucault, 2007). Through this case study we 
can see how the undermining of autonomous control of this type of rule enables 
the committing of politicide and renders political independence ineffective. 
Thus, while debates focusing on state formation underline the sovereign aspects 
as prerequisites for the establishment of a state, the ability to maintain 
governmentalizing powers is under-theorized in this context. Yet, as the case of 
Palestine demonstrates, these appear as (perhaps unsatisfactory yet) necessary 
conditions for gaining political independence. The analysis in this paper 
exposed these conditions by focusing on politicide rather than of questions 
relating to what makes a state. The reversal of the perspective of examination, 
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the search for the factors which are actively interrupting the realization of 
political independence, instead of searching for the necessary conditions for 
state-formation, have highlighted these conditions. The case of the politicide of 
Palestine has proven to be particularly informative, since it allowed examining 
how state establishment is sabotaged when formal conditions for independence 
are ripe.  
Thus, in this paper I have aimed to demonstrate how thinking through the 
concept of politicide may be instrumental in political analysis, and how it aids 
us in understanding the spatial and temporal orientations of configurations of 
rulership and domination over populations entangled in political struggles. 
This analysis has also highlighted the intricate ways in which the discursive 
formations of politicide may intertwine with implemented policies of politicide. 
To the extent that this concept of politicide appeared in literature, it was mostly 
articulated as being carried out through the use of direct violence. Yet, the 
analysis I have offered here has demonstrated that politicide can also be 
manifested through a broad range of forms of control that intertwine enabling 
and prohibiting processes simultaneously, processes which combine facilitation 
and strangulation, identity-formation and the creation of schisms, processes 
which range beyond the use of direct violence for destruction and annihilation. 
The overemphasis on the role of direct violence in understanding politicide also 
over-simplifies the spatial analysis it entails, and may downplay some of the 
complexities that are part and parcel of the spatiality of politicide. Politicide as 
it is carried out by use of governmentalizing as well as administrative means 
implies a more complex analysis of its spatial implementations. The 
manifestations of processes of governmentality reshape space and its uses for 
particular groups in subtle and complex ways. Thus, seeing the more intricate 
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ways this kind of analysis entails, expands our understanding of how the 
production of particular types of spatialities are integral to state-formation, or, 
by contrary, for committing politicide by preventing such formations to take 
place.  
NOTES 
1. Maintaining Israel’s strategic advantage over all other armies in the Middle East has 
been underlying US-Israel relations in general, and US military assistance to Israel in 
particular, since the early 1980s Hadar, L. T. (1991) Quagmire: America in the Middle 
East. Washington: Cato Institute. 
2. For instance, in response to the UN Secretary-General criticism of yet another 
expansion of the settlements by Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated in 
January 2016 that “The words of the secretary-general only bolster terrorism. There is 
no justification for terrorism, period. The Palestinian murderers do not want to build 
a state. They want to destroy a state. And they declare it publicly.” Goodman, A. (2016) 
"The Settlers": New Film Reveals History & Consequences of Israeli Settlements on 
Palestinian Land, Democracy Now. 28 Janurary 2016 [Online]. Available online: 
http://m.democracynow.org/stories/15907, [Accessed 29 May 2016]. 
3. As a highly charged political issue, reliable demographic data accurately reflecting 
the number of Jews and Palestinians living in historical Palestine is hard to come by. 
Without trying to resolve this dispute, the figures provided by the geo-demographer 
Arnon Soffer dominate the Israeli discourse and are also almost unanimously accepted 
among the mainstream Israeli political elite. Soffer, who draws his figures from the 
research of Sergio della Pergola claim that as of 2014 the population of historical 
Palestine was composed of 51% Jews and 49% Muslims, and that given the higher 
birthrates of the Palestinians, these proportions will tip in favor of the Muslims by the 
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end of the decade Canetti, N. (2015) A Biational State: A Disaster or Perhaps a Solution. 
Liberal, 9. 
4. Famously, to overcome this almost hermetic spatial control the Gazans have 
developed an elaborated system of tunnels mainly for commercial usages, but some 
also for military purposes. For a full analysis of the role of these tunnels in sustaining 
the Israeli-dictated status-quo Amir, M. (Forthcoming) Productive Failures: Making 
Sense of Israel’s Policies in the Gaza Strip. 
5. Very generally, Israel has been exercising a policy of politicide also through the 
defragmentation of the Palestinian political community. These policies dissect the 
Palestinian people into five major groups. This separation is not only enforced 
geographically (by borders, walls, checkpoints, and limitations on movement), but also 
by differentiations in the civic statuses. Thus, effectively, the Palestinians are divided 
into the West Bankers (who are subject of Israeli military rule and of the Palestinian 
Authority), the Gazans (who are subjects of Israeli military rule and the Hamas), East 
Jerusalemites (who are holders of an Israeli residency), the Palestinians living inside 
the 1949 borders of Israel (who have Israeli citizenship), and the Palestinian diaspora 
(who have none of the above). Israeli control of Palestinian registry fixates these 
categories, as Israel makes any attempt to transition between these different categories, 
which sometimes even divide nuclear families, either extremely difficult or completely 
impossible Jamal, A. (2002) Beyond "Ethnic Democracy": State Structure, 
Multicultural Conflict and Differentiated Citizenship in Israel. New Political Science, 
24(3), 411-431, Nikfar, B. M. (2005) Families Divided: An Analysis of Israel's 
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law. Nw. Univ. J. Int'l Hum. Rts., 3, 1-20, 
Loewenstein, J. (2006) Identity and movement control in the OPT. Forced Migration, 
26, 24-26, Amir, M. (2011) On the Border of Indeterminacy: The Separation Wall in 
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East Jerusalem. Geopolitics, 16(4), 768-792, HRW (2012) "Forget About Him, He's 
Not Here" Israel's Control of Palestinian Residency in the West Bank and Gaza.  
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